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Monarchical State-building through State Destruction: 
Hohenzollern Self-legitimization at the Expense of Deposed 
Dynasties in the Kaiserreich* 
Dr Jasper Heinzen, Department of History, University of York 
 
Abstract 
The German War of 1866 was a turning point in the consolidation of Prussian hegemony over the 
emerging German nation-state. This article engages with a neglected aspect of this process by 
LQYHVWLJDWLQJ WKH GHVWDELOL]LQJ HIIHFW RI 3UXVVLD·V WHUULWRULDO H[SDnsion at the expense of fellow 
monarchies in Hanover, Hessen-Kassel, Nassau and Schleswig-Holstein. It argues that the hostile 
response of ruling houses related to the deposed dynasties and the disapprobation of legitimists at 
home placed the Hohenzollerns in a difficult position, as they often found themselves caught 
EHWZHHQ WKH LQIRUPDO \HW SDOSDEOH SUHVVXUH RI (XURSH·V ¶5R\DO ,QWHUQDWLRQDO· DQG WKH SROLFLHV
pursued by their chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. To escape this dilemma, King (from 1871 onwards 
Kaiser) Wilhelm and his successors sought to bring about a reconciliation with the alienated 
G\QDVWLHVWKURXJKWUHDW\VHWWOHPHQWVLQWHUPDUULDJHDQGWKHDSSURSULDWLRQRIWKHLUULYDOV·V\PEROLF
capital in public speech acts. The way in which the Hohenzollerns courted their detractors betrayed 
a versatility that scholarship on the Prussian cult of monarchy has yet to fully appreciate. In fact, 
WKH+RKHQ]ROOHUQFRXUW·VORQJ-term preoccupation with sectional reconciliation reveals much not 
only about royal diplomacy in the second half of the nineteenth century but also about the workings 
RI*HUPDQ\·VPRQDUFKRFHQWULFIHGHUDOHGLILFHDQGWKHUROHRIFLYLFLQLWLDWLYHLQWKHSURPRWLRQRI
monarchical legitimacy. 
On an overcast late-autumn morning in October 1909 thousands of curious citizens 
migrated to the Adolfshöhe near Biebrich in the Prussian province of Hesse-Nassau. 
While they took their seats on specially erected bleachers, several hundred guests of 
honour entered a fenced-off area, at whose centre stood a large podium and tent. Here 
WKHSURYLQFH·VOHDGLQJRIILFLDOVDQGPLOLWDU\RIILFHUVDZDLWHGWKHDUULYDORI3ULQFH$XJXVW
Wilhelm of Prussia, the grand duke of Baden, the prince and princess of Wied and³
most intriguingly³an official delegation from Luxembourg headed by Crown Princess 
Marie Adelheid. The occasion for this high-profile spectacle was the unveiling of the 
Nassauvian State Monument (Nassauisches Landesdenkmal), which celebrated the 
achievements of the Nassau dynasty as rulers of the eponymous duchy (1815²1866). In 
his welcome speech, the chairman of the monument committee praised Princess 
Adelheid Marie's Nassauvian ancestors for having fused the disparate territories they 
had acquired during the Napoleonic period into one state with a durable identity. The 
state monument itself expanded on this message with allegorical representations of 
JORU\ORYHDQGOR\DOW\EHORZDVWDWXHRI1DVVDX·VODVWGXNH$GROSKZKR had inherited 
the grand ducal crown of Luxembourg in 1890. To dispel any last doubts about the 
intended message of the memorial, the eye-catching obelisk behind the statue of Adolph 
FDUULHGWKHLQVFULSWLRQ¶7RWKH1DVVDXYLDQUXOLQJKRXVHLQORYHDQGYHQHUation, their 
JUDWHIXOSHRSOH·1 
At first glance this apotheosis of a dynast, about whom Kaiser Wilhelm II privately said 
that he would have been better suited for the life of a forest ranger, appears like one of 
the many invented traditions through which Wilhelmine Germans symbolically 
experienced royal authority. What made the ceremony nevertheless stand out was the 
fact that the House of Nassau had not reigned in Nassau for more than forty years and 
that the very Hohenzollerns whose representative was now joining in the festivities had 
EHHQ WKH FDXVH RI WKHLU UHODWLYHV· GHWKURQHPHQW 'XNH $GROSK KDG UHIXVHG WR WDNH
3UXVVLD·V VLGH LQ WKH *HUPDQ FLYLO ZDU RI  DQG DV SXQLVKPHQW WKH YLFWRULRXV
Hohenzollerns had annexed Nassau along with other uncooperative states like the 
kingdom of Hanover, the electorate of Hesse-Kassel and the city of Frankfurt.2 ¶7KH
very existence of said states between the eastern and western halves of the [Prussian] 
PRQDUFK\LVDJHRJUDSKLFDOWKUHDW·WKXQGHUHG%LVPDUFNLQWKHcabinet meeting where 
the decision was taken, and when the Russian tsar, Alexander II, protested against the 
removal of monarchs ruling by divine grace, the Prussian chief minister rejoined that 
Prussia would proclaim the Constitution of 1849 and unfurl the red banner of 
revolution should any foreign power intervene.3 As if to drive home the point Berlin 
defied the claim of the Sonderburg-Augustenburg dynasty to Schleswig-Holstein and 
absorbed the two duchies for good measure as well, garnering Bismarck the reputation 
RI DQ XQFRPSURPLVLQJ ¶ZKLWH UHYROXWLRQDU\· LQ WKH VHUYLFH RI 3UXVVLDQ raison 
G·pWDW.4 What, then, explains the ostentatious display of inter-dynastic reconciliation at 
Biebrich several decades later? Was the unveiling of the Nassauvian State Monument 
just an aberration or did it perhaps signify something else about monarchical legitimacy 
in the Kaiserreich? 
To answer these deceptively simple questions, due consideration must be given to the 
remarkably long-OLYHG SHUIRUPDQFH RI (XURSH·V UR\DO KRXses as engines of 
modernization. Not long ago the historian Dieter Langewiesche paid tribute to their 
DFKLHYHPHQWVE\ UHQDPLQJ WKHV WKH ¶FHQWXU\RIPRQDUFK\·EHFDXVH WKHFURZQV
were not only among the few time-honoured institutions to survive the transformations 
wrought by the French Revolution but also successfully engineered state-building 
reforms that enabled commercial, cultural and other kinds of progress in the first place 
and made monarchs valued intermediaries between past and present.5 Although 
/DQJHZLHVFKH·VEULHIUHIOHFWLRQVFDQEXWSDLQWDURXJKVNHWFKRIKLVWRULFDOFKDQJHKLV
work is emblematic of the wider reassessment that the history of monarchy has 
undergone in recent work on nationalism, the development of mass culture, 
constitutional JRYHUQDQFH DQG DQFLOODU\ DUHDV RI PRGHUQL]DWLRQ 7KH ¶+HLUV WR WKH
7KURQH·UHVHDUFKSURMHFWFXUUHQWO\XQGHUZD\DWWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI6W$QGUHZVXQGHUWKH
OHDGHUVKLSRI)UDQN/RUHQ]0OOHU5REHUW+D]HOO·VFRPSDUDWLYHUHVHDUFKRQZHVWHUQ
European monarchies DW8QLYHUVLW\&ROOHJH/RQGRQ·V¶&RQVWLWXWLRQ8QLW·DVZHOODVWKH
flourishing forum for debate provided by the Society for Court Studies and the Royal 
Studies Network with their attendant journals confirm the return of kings and queens 
to the mainstream of Anglo-American historiography, not to mention parallel 
developments in other countries.6 That said, the fact that monarchs still manage to 
attract so much scholarly attention in spite of the sophisticated challenge presented by 
¶KLVWRU\IURPEHORZ·LVD sign of as yet unanswered questions about the adaptability of 
monarchies to changing socio-political environments, the global projection of 
European power in the nineteenth century and the mechanics of international relations.7 
0LQGIXORIWKH*HUPDQ:DU·V sesquicentennial in 2016, the present article contributes 
WR WKLV WKULYLQJ ILHOGRI HQTXLU\E\ LQYHVWLJDWLQJ WKHSKHQRPHQRQRIG\QDVWLF ¶VWDWH-
EXLOGLQJ WKURXJK VWDWH GHVWUXFWLRQ· DJDLQVW WKH EDFNJURXQG RI VXEQDWLRQDO SROLWLFDO
HQWLWLHV·FRQVROLGDWLRQLQWR nation-states during the nineteenth century.8 If one adopts 
9RONHU 6HOOLQ·V KHXULVWLF GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ FRXQWULHV WKDW RSWHG IRU PRQDUFKLFDO
constitutions after their creation like Belgium, countries whose monarchies were 
instrumental in the establishment of the nation-state like France, and, finally, syntheses 
of both like Britain, the Prussian method of national unification at the expense of other 
dynasts constituted a special manifestation of the second type.9 State creation through 
conquest entailed VSHFLDO ULVNV WKRXJK LWZLOOEHDUJXHGWKDW3UXVVLD·VDFWLRQV LQ WKH
summer of 1866 hurt its own credibility in the eyes of monarchical legitimists and 
foreign rulers, and that the Hohenzollerns therefore made it a priority to mend fences 
with the dynasties they had dispossessed. 
The process of reconciliation played out before both diplomatic and domestic 
audiences. The exiled monarchs had familial ties to other European courts that showed 
LUULWDWLRQDW%HUOLQ·VKLJK-handed conduct, not least because of the violation of their 
own agnatic rights by the abolition of the thrones in question. Although neither Tsar 
Alexander II nor Queen Victoria of England went so far as to pursue retaliation by 
violent means, resentment lingered for the treatment meted out to their relatives and 
occasionally the grievances of these courts rose to the surface during moments of 
international tension. In the domestic sphere the dethronement of the Guelph, Brabant, 
Nassauvian and Augustenburg dynasties was likewise sure to remain a contentious issue 
GXHWRWKH¶PRQDUFKRFHQWULF·PDNH-up of the German polity.10 The larger states of the 
¶7KLUG*HUPDQ\·VXFKDV+DQRYHUKDGGHYHORSHGHODERUDWH¶WULEDO·stammlich) and other 
cultural idioms to anchor dynastic loyalty in the minds of the heterogeneous 
populations acquired from the debris of the Holy Roman Empire.11 From the vantage 
point of state-EXLOGLQJ 3UXVVLD·V GLVSODFHPHQW RI IRXU OHJLWLPDWHG\QDVWLHV WKHUHIRUH
EHFDPHDFFRUGLQJWR+DQV6FKPLWWWKH¶PRVWHPEDUUDVVLQJFRQVHTXHQFHRIthe war of 
· EHFDXVH WKH +RKHQ]ROOHUQV FRXOG QHYHU IHHO TXLWH VXUH RI WKHLU QHZ VXEMHFWV·
loyalty as long as the monarchs in exile refused to relinquish their titles and thereby 
presented a latent alternative to the Prussian system of rule.12 
The pacification of the annexed provinces was complicated by the two-pronged mission 
of Hohenzollern state-building, which pursued the dual aim of making Prussians and 
raising Germans. School textbooks, patriotic commemorations and the army insisted 
that the two identities went hand in glove, even though Hanoverians and Nassauers 
often found it easier to identify with the Hohenzollerns as figureheads of the entire 
German nation than as champions of Prussian particularist traditions that clashed with 
their contrarian historical memories.13 This essay will explore the strategies 
Hohenzollern rulers developed to cement their fragile legitimacy. These solutions were 
not free from contradictions because, as Mark Hewitson shrewdly notes, by Wilhelm 
,,·V UHLJQ WKHSRSXODULW\RI WKHNDLVHU ¶FDPH WR UHVW HLWKHURQ WKH UDSLG LQYHQWLRQRI
political traditions or on a cult of modernity, confusingly mixed with archaism, that was 
GHVLJQHGWRFRPSHQVDWHIRUDQ\SROLWLFDOVKRUWFRPLQJV·14 Due to such paradoxes some 
historians conclude that the Hohenzollern court proved unable, in the final analysis, to 
devise popular, national rituals in place of the older Prussian dynastic ones.15 By 
contrast, it will be suggested that the symbolic assimilation of the annexed provinces 
LQWR3UXVVLD·V cult of monarchy bore a nuance that made Hohenzollern kingship both 
Prussian and transcendental. The first part of the discussion will examine why the 
German War was a historical watershed for the Hohenzollerns before I turn in the 
second and third sections to the foreign-political and domestic aftermath of this event. 
 
$¶5XGH6KRFN·7KH2YHUWKURZRI0RQDUFKLHVLQ+LVWRULFDO
Context 
.LQJ:LOKHOP·VDVVHQWWRWKHUHPRYDORIIHOORZPRQDUFKVDWWKHHQGRIWKH*HUPDQ
War was in itself neither XQXVXDOQRUQRYHO5XOHUVUHLJQLQJ¶E\GLYLQHSURYLGHQFH·FRXOG
look back on a long series of revolts and wars in which either their subjects or even 
foreign rivals had challenged their authority to govern. The most serious attack on 
divine monarchy had ePDQDWHGIURPWKH)UHQFK5HYROXWLRQIROORZHGE\1DSROHRQ·V
dethronement of established dynasties like the Bourbons in Spain and the mediatization 
of smaller principalities in Germany and the Italian peninsula. Prussia itself became one 
of the major beneficLDULHVRI1DSROHRQ·V UHIRUPVDW WKH&RQJUHVVRI9LHQQD
where the Hohenzollerns acquired territories previously seized from the Catholic 
church and imperial knights in the Rhineland and Westphalia.16 Yet the fifty years of 
relative peace spanning the end of the Napoleonic era and the German Wars of 
Unification (1863²DIIRUGHGWKH¶VDWLDWHG·PRQDUFKLHVLQ*HUPDQ\DPXFK-needed 
opportunity to consolidate their gains and discredit anyone who wilfully upset the status 
quo. This readjustment to the exigencies of state-building prompted an expansion of 
government bureaucracies, conscription and new patriotic pedagogies that were 
premised on the idea that sovereigns ruled over self-evident, organically grown 
communities. 
A notable practitioner was the Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm IV (ruled 1840²1861), 
whose mystical conception of kingship was founded on the belief that divinely 
enlightened monarchs should govern on behalf of and, where necessary, in consultation 
with the ancient corporations (Stände) of the realm.17 The fiction of natural harmony 
between the interests of the crown and the people was taken even further in the 
medium-sized German states. Here propagandists employed the metaphor of 
the Stamm, which carried not only primordial, quasi-ethnic FRQQRWDWLRQV RI ¶WULEDO·
group relations but also configured the dynasty as a tree trunk with branches that 
signified territories and populations won through inheritance, war or diplomacy over 
time.18 This symbolic visualization implied that subjects enjoyed the benefits of order, 
stability and prosperity thanks to the crown because the achievements of the state and 
the ruling house were one and the same. The author of a widely used Hanoverian 
textbook for secondary schools from the early 1860s expressed these sentiments well 
ZKHQKHUHPLQGHGKLVUHDGHUVWKDWIRUDVORQJDVNLQJDQGVXEMHFWV¶UHFRJQL]HGWKHLU
FRPPRQGHVWLQ\DQGVWRRGE\HDFKRWKHUIDLWKIXOO\IURPEHJLQQLQJWRHQG·WKH\ZRXOG
master all adversity.19 Tellingly, too, a similar textbook from Nassau made the frank 
DGPLVVLRQWKDWWKHKLVWRU\RIWKHUXOLQJKRXVHIRUPHG¶TXLWHQDWXUDOO\·WKHUHGWKUHDGRI
UHJLRQDO KLVWRU\ RQ DFFRXQW RI WKH GXFK\·V DUWLILFLDO JHQHVLV20 The revalorization of 
monarchical legitimacy in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars enabled combative 
defenders of royal sovereignty like Georg V of Hanover, Adolph of Nassau, Friedrich 
Wilhelm of Hessen-.DVVHODQG)ULHGULFK:LOKHOP,9RI3UXVVLD·VVXFFHVVRU:LOKHOP
to implement unpopular policies and survive political battles with their parliaments that 
might otherwise have cost them their crowns.21 
To return to the question of why the dethronement of unloved German princes in 1866 
would attract so much attention, the simple answer is that this coup was staged not by 
revolutionary firebrands or political upstarts but rather by a conservative monarch 
against like-minded peers. Wilhelm himself hesitated for a moment to divest his 
adversaries of their legitimate patrimony because he felt that such a step smacked too 
PXFKRI¶(PSHURU1DSROHRQ·VDFWVRIYLROHQFH·22 Alexander II of Russia warned his 
XQFOHRIWKH¶UXGHVKRFN·WKDWWKHPRQDUFKLFDOSULQFLSOHZDVDERXWWRVXIIHU&RQIURQWHG
with weighty problems of his own following a recent Polish uprising and serf 
HPDQFLSDWLRQ WKHWVDU·VUHFHSWLon of the Hanoverian envoy sent to St Petersburg to 
HQOLVWKLVKHOSZDVPRUHJORRP\VWLOO ¶,WRQO\UHPDLQVIRUPHWRZLVKWKDWWKHVRFLDO
order and peace of Europe have not been upset too much by the consequences of this 
FULVLV·23 Although the prospect of territorial gains swayed Wilhelm to proceed with the 
DQQH[DWLRQVDOOWKHVDPHWKLVGLGQRWSXWDQHQGWRFULWLFV·GRZQEHDWSUHGLFWLRQV2Q
the contrary, Prussian conservatives of the Kreuzzeitungspartei variety 
and großdeutsch federalists felt they now had all the more reason to accuse the Prussian 
FRXUW RI ZDQWLQJ WR HVWDEOLVK D ¶FDHVDULVW· XQLYHUVDO PRQDUFK\ WKDW ZRXOG XSVHW WKH
balance of power in Europe and make the government beholden to the inchoate will of 
the masses.24BismDUFN·VIRUPHUPHQWRUDQGFRQILGDQWRI)ULHGULFK:LOKHOP,9(UQVW
Ludwig von Gerlach, voiced his protest in a most poignant, albeit incongruous, way by 
getting himself elected to the very body conservatives associated with Bismarckian 
caesarism, the Reichstag, as a candidate for the anti-governmental Guelph-Centre Party 
coalition in Hanover.25 *HUODFK·VDOOLDQFHZLWKWKH&HQWUHZDVQRFRLQFLGHQFHIRUWKH
party leader, the Hanoverian ex²justice minister Ludwig Windhorst, was a firm believer 
in dynastic rights and advised the Guelphs on legal matters.26 Some members of the 
clergy (most notably orthodox Lutherans in Hanover and the Hessian Renitenz around 
August Vilmar) lent moral support to the legitimist cause in condemning the 
Hohenzollern for their infringHPHQW RI WKH HLJKWK FRPPDQGPHQW ¶7KRX VKDOW QRW
VWHDO·27 Unsurprisingly, the deposed princes and their apologists tried to capitalize on 
previous state-building efforts in order to convince public opinion that the philosophy 
RI¶PLJKWPDNHVULJKW·SURYLGHGDQXQDWWUDFWLYHLIQRWWRVD\XQKRO\EDVLVIRUVXEMHFWV·
OR\DOW\WRWKHVRYHUHLJQ¶7KHROGHVWG\QDVW\LQ(XURSH·EHJDQDSRSXODUDSSHDOE\WKH
Hanoverian Guelphs to boycott the promulgation of the annexation law, 
your royal house, with whom you have shared good and bad times for a thousand years, with 
ZKRVHPDJQLILFHQWDQFHVWRUV\RXUEUDYHDQGQREOHIRUHEHDUVKDYHZRQJORU\RQWKHEDWWOHILHOG«
and made Hanover a respected name in peaceful competition with other German brother tribes, 
will cease to exist; a foreign king will govern you who, despite being a German prince, has nothing 
in common with you except that his crown comes from the same place as that of your ancestral 
ruling house³IURPWKH/RUG·VWDEOHZKLFKLVWRVD\E\GLYLQHJUDFH28 
Not content to merely protest, Georg V paid journalists and press agents lavish sums 
to sway southern German and foreign governments in favour of intervention on his 
behalf. His personal wealth allowed him for a time to spend as much on bribes to the 
French press as Prussia and Austria-Hungary.29 In addition, the exiled king funded 
paramilitary expatriate organizations in Britain and France, collectively known as the 
¶*XHOSK/HJLRQ·WRSUHSDUHIRUDIXWXUH(XURSHDQZDULQZKLFKWKH\ZRXOGVLGHZLWK
3UXVVLD·V Hnemies to liberate the Hanoverian fatherland.30 Finally, after notifying 
(XURSHDQ JRYHUQPHQWV RI KLV UHIXVDO WR DFNQRZOHGJH WKH OHJDOLW\ RI 3UXVVLD·V
conquests³the elector of Hesse-Kassel would do the same two years later, in 1868³
Georg V put out feelers to other disaffected courts to sound out the possibility of 
concerted action against Prussia. The negotiations with Vienna, Paris and Florence were 
serious enough to trouble Bismarck because they precipitated unfavourable rumours in 
the southern German kingdoms during the lead-up to the Franco-Prussian War that 
Napoleon III planned the creation of a Guelph-ruled buffer state between France and 
Prussia.31 
To be sure, the importance of these machinations and their impact on popular opinion 
should not be exaggeUDWHG ,Q IDFWQRWHYHU\ERG\EHPRDQHG3UXVVLD·VGLVUHJDUG IRU
monarchical legitimacy. The liberal movement for the most part condoned, even 
welcomed, the departure of their erstwhile tormentors and hoped that the territorial 
aggrandizement of Prussia might become a stepping stone for the establishment of a 
unified, parliamentary nation-state, in which the bourgeoisie rather than the princes set 
the political agenda.32 6RPH SURJUHVVLYHV HYHQ GDUHG RSHQO\ TXHVWLRQ VWDWH EXLOGHUV·
insistence on the historical bond between dynasties and their territorial domains. 
¶+DQRYHULDQV· FDXWLRQHG +HLQULFK $OEHUW 2SSHUPDQQ D ORQJ-suffering victim of 
*XHOSKSHUVHFXWLRQ ¶GRQ·WEH IRROHG LQWREHOLHYLQJ WKDW WKHUH H[LVWV D JORULRXVSDVW
which forbids a submission to PrussiD$V+DQRYHULDQVZHGRQ·WKDYHVXFKDWKLQJ«
,KDWHWKHZRUG¶DQFHVWUDO·>angestammt]; it reminds me of livestock [Stammvieh@·33 Liberal 
UHDFWLRQV WR3UXVVLD·V WUHDWPHQWRI WKHPDLQFODLPDQW WR WKH6FKOHVZLJ DQG+ROVWHLQ
throne, Duke Friedrich (VIII), threw the demystification of monarchy into equally stark 
relief. Although the lower chamber of the Prussian parliament and the National 
$VVRFLDWLRQ SDVVHG PRWLRQV LQ  UHDIILUPLQJ WKHLU FRPPLWPHQW WR WKH GXNH·V
claims on account of his strong liberal leanings, support from this corner began to flag 
once Prussian raison G·pWDW had gained the upper hand in Germany, even if Schleswig-
Holsteiners like the historian Theodor Mommsen continued to decry Bismarckian 
injustice. In other words, the majority of liberals were prepared to sacrifice the 
$XJXVWHQEXUJVDQGWKHLUKDSOHVVFRKRUWVWRWKH¶ZURQJPDQZLWKWKHULJKWLGHDV·ZKHUH
the parochialism of small dynastic states clashed with the interests of the national 
collective.34 
 
Monarchical Legitimacy and the Long Reach of the Royal 
International 
Despite or perhaps because of the surging strength of bourgeois liberalism, German 
constitutional theory assigned central importance to the notion that sovereignty in the 
emerging Reich rested foremost with the princes. According to this reading of imperial 
politics, national culture emanated less from shared cultural traits than from a federal 
contract between twenty-two monarchs, three free cities and the Reichsland Alsace-
Lorraine. The way Bismarck saw it, the constitution of the Second Empire was in effect 
DQ ¶LQWHUVWDWH WUHDW\· FRQVHTXHQWO\ KH LQVLVWHG WKDW ¶LI SDUWLHV WR WKLV FRQWUDFW
XQDQLPRXVO\GHFLGHWRZLWKGUDZWKH ODWWHUFHDVHWRH[LVW·$OWKRXJKWKHFKDQFHOORU·V
position that national sovereignty derived from the states encountered resistance from 
defenders of imperial supremacy, the related juridical premise that the pouvoir 
constituant in the state issued from the monarchy had been widely accepted across 
(XURSH HYHU VLQFH /RXLV ;9,,,·V Charte constitutionelle of 1814.35 Aside from 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQV RI FRQVWLWXWLRQDO SUDFWLFH WKH NLQG RI ¶PRQDUFKLFDO QDWLRQDOLVP·
favoured by Bismarck or, a generation later, by the historians Friedrich Meinecke and 
Otto Hintze also served a none-too-subtle psychological purpose. To learn patriotism, 
the founder of the Reich GHFODUHGLQKLVPHPRLUV*HUPDQVQHHGHGVWDWHVKHDGHGE\¶D
SULQFHRQZKRPWKHLU OR\DOW\FDQEH IRFXVHG· WRSUHYHQW WKHPIURPIDOOLQJ ¶SUH\ WR
QDWLRQVZKRDUHPRUHWLJKWO\IRUJHGWRJHWKHU·36 
In the final anal\VLVVXFKDSSHDOVWRHVWDEOLVKHGDWWDFKPHQWVFORDNHG3UXVVLDQOHDGHUV·
dependence on the cooperation of other monarchs lest the new nation-state be 
popularly perceived as a vehicle of Prussian domination. For instance, one of the 
reasons why Berlin agreed to restore occupied Saxony to King Johann following the 
end of the German War was that they did not want to raise anti-Prussian feelings higher 
than they already were.37 The reactionary chief minister of the grand duchy of Hesse-
Darmstadt, Reinhard von Dalwigk, underlined the degree of legitimist mistrust by 
stating defiantly that if he ever saw his master being deprived of his sovereignty, he 
ZRXOGUDWKHUWXUQUHSXEOLFDQWKDQEHFRPHD¶VHFRQG-FODVV3UXVVLDQ·38 Even senior civil 
servants and fellow monarchs, who outwardly accepted or at least condoned the 
outcome of the German War, could be heard grumbling that Bismarck had taken the 
pursuit of Prussian raison G·pWDW too far and that something needed to be done to reverse 
WKLVGHYHORSPHQW¶3HUKDSVLWVHUYHd me quite well and it certainly benefited the royal 
VHUYLFH·WKH3UXVVLDQPLOLWDU\HQYR\DWWKHFRXUWRI6W3HWHUVEXUJ*HQHUDO+DQV/RWKDU
YRQ6FKZHLQLW]ODWHUFRQIHVVHG¶WKDW,ZDVNHSWLQWKHGDUNDERXWWKHSUHFLVHPRYHVRI
%HUOLQ·VGHFLVLRQ-makers because as an officer and gentleman I would not have been 
DEOHWRGHIHQGWKHP·+HDQGKLVFORVHSROLWLFDODOO\3ULQFH+HLQULFK9,,RI5HXZRXOG
dedicate the rest of their diplomatic careers as ambassadors in Vienna and St Petersburg 
respectively to repairing the damage that the principle of monarchical legitimacy had 
suffered.39 
Such conservative efforts to shore up monarchical solidarity were not misplaced. 
Fearful that the king of Hanover and elector of Hesse-.DVVHO·VIDWHFRXOGDOOWRRHDVLO\
become their own, both Grand Duke Friedrich Wilhelm of Mecklenburg-Strelitz and 
Prince Heinrich XXII of Reuß (older branch) expressed their protest by appointing 
officials from states once aligned against Prussia, like the former Hanoverian cabinet 
member Wilhelm Freiherr von Hammerstein-Loxten, who served as Mecklenburg-
6WUHOLW]·VFKLHIPLQLVWHUIURPXQWLOKLVGHDWKLQ2WKHU+DQRYHULDQVIRXQGD
home at the Saxon court and in the army, where they could continue to cultivate their 
allegiance to the Guelphs to some degree.40 
In an objective sense the anti-Prussian jibes of middling and minor potentates could 
make little difference to the distribution of power in the Reich. The Hohenzollern 
emperor-kings de facto remained the only monarchs to exercise full political 
sovereignty.41 Furthermore, owing to the demographic, military and administrative 
preponderance of Prussia, the other princes were left with limited means to challenge 
the imperial executive. Even if the constitution gave the non-Prussian monarchies a 
OHJLVODWLYH YHWR LQ WKH )HGHUDO &RXQFLO )UDQN /RUHQ] 0OOHU·V YHUGLFW LV QR GRXEW
FRUUHFW WKHFUHDWLRQRI WKH5HLFKPDUNHG ¶D IXQGDPHQWDO VKLIW IURPD IHGHUDWLRQRI
states (Staatenbund) to a Prussian-dominated federal state (Bundesstaat·42 
Still, the residual clout of the German monarchs was considerable, largely because of 
their familial connections to dynasties abroad. Johannes Paulmann has spoken in this 
FRQWH[WRID¶5R\DO,QWHUQDWLRQDO·KHOGWRJHWKHUE\IDPLOLDOWLHVFRUSRUDWHVRFLDOLGHQWLW\
and a shared concern for collective security.43For much of the nineteenth century this 
august club occupied a subsidiary sphere of international politics that reacted sensitively 
to seismic shifts in the balance of power, as the Prussian government discovered in its 
dealings with the dethroned dynasties after the German War. After all, the duke of 
Nassau was linked to the Dutch House of Orange and remained in the line of 
succession to the throne of Luxembourg, while Georg V was a close relative of the 
British royal family and stood to inherit the duchy of Brunswick. Queen Victoria of 
England was very conscious of her German ancestry and liked to emphasize how 
changes in the status of one branch of her extended family impacted on the prestige of 
the others. In this spirit she reminded her daughter the Prussian crown princess 
Victoria, 
the poor King [Georg V] represents, in the male line, our family, and the feeling here would be 
greatly roused against the King of P[russia] if poor King George and his family, after being 
despoiled of their own lawful possessions, were left in poverty and in a position not befitting to 
their rank and near relationship to our family.44 
7KHTXHHQ·VOHWWHUUHIOHFWHGWKHDPELYDOHQWQDWXUHRIUR\DOGLSORPDF\ZKLFKUHOLHGRQ
the symbolic capital of the Royal International but acted independently of, and 
sometimes in opposition to, diplomatic channels of communication. Victoria knew she 
could not rely on the British government to enforce her demands, for both the Whigs 
and the Conservatives maintained neutrality towards the belligerents of the German 
War.45 It is indicative of the ill-defined boundaries between royal and official diplomacy 
that Whitehall nevertheless heeded her semi-SULYDWHUHTXHVWWRLQWHUFHGHRQKHUFRXVLQ·V
behalf. The drawn-out negotiations that followed between Bismarck and Georg V 
underscored the malleability of the distinction in matters pertaining to the monarchical 
interest. While the British ambassador in Berlin, Lord Augustus Loftus, somewhat 
disingenuously insisted, 
WKHLQWHUHVWHYLQFHGE\+HU0DMHVW\·V*RYHUQPHQWLQWKLVTXHVWLRQLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIWKHIDFWRI
WKH.LQJ·VEHLQJQHDUO\UHODWHGWRWKH5R\DO)DPLO\RI(QJODQGZDVGLFWDWHGE\DZLVKWRUHQGHU
mutual service to both His Majesty [the King of Prussia] and to the King of Hanover, 
the Prussian chief minister opted for the alternative tactic of wilfully ignoring the duality 
of public and private monarchical agency.46 As he put it in an internal memorandum, 
no matter the material cost, peace treaties with the deposed princes were valuable 
EHFDXVH RI WKH DQWLFLSDWHG SRVLWLYH ¶LPSUHVVLRQ LQ (XURSH RYHUDOO·47 Strikingly, like 
Queen Victoria before him, Bismarck rhetorically enlisted here the plebiscitary aid of 
public opinion as a cipher for the will of the Royal International. 
The diffuse yet palpable authority of this imagined community could be felt where it 
was absent, as a comparison of the compensation offered to ex-monarchs in the 1860s 
and after the First World War bears out. The victims of the Italian Risorgimento and 
German national unification, being connected to a wide network of royalty abroad, 
could expect generous terms. Grand Duke Ferdinand IV of Tuscany had his confiscated 
property returned to him upon the formal renunciation of his claims in favour of 
Piedmont.48 Georg V of Hanover, the elector of Hesse-Kassel and the duke of Nassau 
were luckier still because they did not even have to abdicate to receive financial 
remuneration for their troubles.49 Bereft of the support of powerful peers, the abdicated 
German princes could not count on such courtesy after 1918 and were fortunate that 
the electorate voted to compensate them at all.50 Rather than negating the sway of the 
5R\DO,QWHUQDWLRQDOWKH3UXVVLDQJRYHUQPHQW·VGHFLVLRQWRUHSXGLDWHLWVVHWtlement with 
Georg V in March 1868 in fact served to suggest the opposite, as the Prussian minister-
president and his allies in the Landtag justified the sequestration of Guelph assets and 
WKHFRQYHUVLRQRIWKHGLYLGHQGVLQWR%LVPDUFN·VSHUVRQDOVOXVKIXQG as punishment for 
the anti-Prussian machinations of Guelph legitimists in Europe.51 
While the sequestration may have restricted the cash flow of the Guelphs, it did not 
VLOHQFH%LVPDUFN·VGHWUDFWRUV*HRUJ9DQGKLVVRQ(UQVW$XJXVWUHPDLQHGDWKRUQLQ
WKH 3UXVVLDQ JRYHUQPHQW·V VLGH EHFDXVH WKH\ HQMR\HG WKH EDFNLQJ RI D YRFDO
independence movement in Hanover as well as the patronage of powerful relatives 
abroad.52 The Guelph-Hohenzollern antagonism came to a head in 1878 when the 
exiled king died and ErnVW$XJXVWZHGGHG.LQJ&KULVWLDQ,;RI'HQPDUN·V\RXQJHVW
daughter, Thyra. The timing of these events was momentous, for they added to the 
volatile atmosphere in which the Congress of Berlin and the realignment of German 
party politics during what has becomHNQRZQDVWKH ¶VHFRQGIRXQGLQJRIWKH5HLFK·
took place that year. If the participation of the Prince of Wales and the French army in 
*HRUJ9·VIXQHUDOFRUWHJHDW3DULVPHUHO\SHUWXUEHGWKH*HUPDQJRYHUQPHQW(UQVW
$XJXVW·VGHFODUDWLRQWRDOO*HUPDQVRYHUeigns and free cities that he was assuming all 
the rights and titles which had belonged to his father was seen as an open 
provocation.53 The notification touched a raw nerve because of the unresolved question 
of whether the Guelphs would be able to claim the duchy of Brunswick upon the death 
of their childless relative, as was their dynastic right, or whether their unresolved dispute 
with Prussia barred them from the line of succession. While Queen Victoria of England, 
*HRUJ9·VFRXVLQDQGWKHH[HFXWUL[RIhis will, was still negotiating the finer points of 
this constitutional problem, the duke of Cumberland (as Ernst August was styled upon 
KLVIDWKHU·VGHDWKDQQRXQFHGWKDWKHKDGHORSHGZLWK3ULQFHVV7K\UDRQ'HFHPEHU 
The union of the two houses complicated an already convoluted situation. Danish-
German relations had been strained since the two Schleswig Wars of 1848 and 1863/4 
DQGWKH'DQLVKUR\DOIDPLO\FRXOGERDVWFORVHOLQNVWRVRPHRI(XURSH·VOHDGLQJUR\DO
families. In fact, the duke of Cumberland·VQHZEURWKHUV-in-law were none other than 
the Prince of Wales, the heir to the Russian throne and King George of Greece. 
&KULVWLDQ,;·VEHVWRZDORI'DQLVKRUGHUVRQDGHOHJDWLRQRI*XHOSKOR\DOLVWVGHOLYHUHG
Bismarck a handy pretext to take a hard stance against what he deemed an emerging 
coalition among Prussia-*HUPDQ\·VGRPHVWLFDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOHQHPLHV+HSURPSWO\
recalled the German ambassador from Copenhagen for the duration of the festivities 
and, to further humiliate the Danish king, chose this moment to announce that Austria 
and Prussia had reached an understanding concerning the abrogation of Article 5 in 
their 1866 peace treaty, which called for a plebiscite in northern Schleswig at some point 
to learn if the local population desired to remain with Prussia or to be united with 
Denmark.54 
The extreme politicization of the Cumberland wedding despite its essentially private 
character highlighted one of the central dilemmas of royal diplomacy, namely, on the 
RQHKDQGPRQDUFKV· UROH DVQDWLRQDO ILJXreheads with responsibilities towards their 
government and subjects and, on the other hand, their cosmopolitan affinities with 
kinsfolk in the rest of Europe. The Hohenzollerns were no exception because the 
¶*XHOSKSUREOHP·FRQIURQWHGFHUWDLQIDPLO\PHPEHUs with awkward choices that were 
not entirely unlike the predicament Christian IX had manoeuvred himself into. The 
*HUPDQ FURZQSULQFH DQG KLV (QJOLVK ZLIH D *XHOSKRQ KHU PRWKHU·V VLGH IRXQG
WKHPVHOYHVFDXJKWEHWZHHQ%LVPDUFN·VUHIXVDOWRPDNHPDMRUFRQcessions while Ernst 
$XJXVWPDLQWDLQHGKLVFODLPWR+DQRYHUDQG4XHHQ9LFWRULD·VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWRVDYH
WKHGXFK\IRUWKH*XHOSKVLQRUGHUWR¶SUHYHQWWKHDEVRUSWLRQRIRXUIDPLO\+HULWDJH
RIZKLFKZHDUHDOOMXVWO\SURXGE\3UXVVLD·55 Since Crown PrincesV9LFWRULD·VK\EULG
national allegiances and what amounted to spying for Queen Victoria at the Berlin court 
retarded her identification with the Hohenzollerns, she was emotionally unfit to defend 
KHUDGRSWLYHFRXQWU\·VSROLFLHVDOOWKHPRUHVRJLYHQ%LVPDUFN·VGHHSGLVWUXVWRIKHU
liberal sympathies and foreign background.56 Although the crown princess made 
genuine attempts to speak up for the German point of view, as numerous letters to her 
mother and the Prince of Wales bear witness, she eventually broke down. When she 
was confronted by the private secretary of the Prince of Wales, she admitted to his great 
surprise, he recorded, 
almost all the charges which one after another I brought against the Prussian Govt., and she could 
only reply that her position was a very difficult one, that she had no power whatever, and that she 
was openly accused of unpatriotic sentiments whenever she ventured to express disapproval of 
what was being done.57 
Torn between his loyalty to the government and the wish to conciliate, the crown prince 
was also prone to major mood swings. Only a few weeks after sending a congratulatory 
QRWH WR &KULVWLDQ ,; RQ WKH RFFDVLRQ RI WKH GXNH RI &XPEHUODQG DQG 7K\UD·V
engagemeQWKHODXQFKHGLQWRDQ¶H[SORVLYHWLUDGH·ZKHQWKH%ULWLVKDPEDVVDGRU/RUG
Odo Russell, alluded to the reception of the Hanoverian delegation in Copenhagen. 
7KHWRQHRIWKHRXWEXUVW¶FRQIRUPHGVROLWWOHWRKLVXVXDOO\PRGHUDWHDQGEHQHYROHQW
ODQJXDJH·5XVVHOOWROGKLV)UHQFKFROOHDJXHWKDWLW¶VWUXFNWKHLQWHUORFXWRUDVEHLQJRXW
RIFKDUDFWHU·58 The outburst reflected the failure of the crown prince and his wife to 
live up to the conflicting expectations set in them, with the result that all their unfocused 
intervention achieved was to reveal their lack of real influence. In private Crown Prince 
)ULHGULFK:LOKHOPIXPHGWKDWWKHFKDQFHOORU·VGHFLVLRQQRWWRFRQVXOWKLPRQWKHGHDO
with Austria discredited him in the eyes of his European relatives.59 The unfolding of 
this human drama behind the scenes of European high politics was not lost on foreign 
diplomats, who reported to their superiors that the royal couple was at best out of step 
with current events and at worst let themselves be duped by Bismarck.60 Viewed 
together, the reports showed Friedrich Wilhelm at his weakest, a far cry from the image 
of the imaginative operator painted in recent historiography and the contemporary ideal 
RI¶KHJHPRQLFPDVFXOLQLW\·ZKLFKGHPDQGHGVHOI-control and strength.61 Thus, rather 
than representing an unequivocal asset, royal diplomacy had the potential to erode the 
symbolic capital of its very practitioners. Moreover, from the vantage point of the 
German state, the competition of royals with the foreign office obstructed the work of 
UHJXODUGLSORPDF\ZKLFKFDUULHGWKHULVNDV%LVPDUFNWHUVHO\SXWLWRI¶PDNLQJNQRWW\
SUREOHPVHYHQPRUHWZLVWHG·62 
7KHHYHQWVRIPDUNHGDSHULRGRI WUDQVLWLRQ LQERWKWKH+RKHQ]ROOHUQFRXUW·V
relations with the dynasties disaffected since the German War and monarchical self-
representation more generally. As Paulmann has shown, royal houses were increasingly 
defined less by their internationalism and more by how they embodied the collective 
self-image of their nations and merged the separate sphere of monarchy with the state 
proper.63 Royal pageantry and meetings between sovereigns facilitated this process by 
symbolically enacting international relations for the benefit of attending spectators and, 
with the help of the mass media, the wider public sphere. However, the fusion of 
national and dynastic discourses came at a heavy price: perceived personal antagonisms 
between monarchs were liable to have a greater impact on national politics and, by 
extension, international relations than before. 
The aftermath of a renewed foray by the Prince of Wales in June 1888 to effect a Guelph 
restoration in Hanover exemplified the shift in communication that had taken place 
since the Cumberland wedding ten years earlier. At the funeral of the German emperor 
Friedrich III, the former Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, the Prince of Wales enquired 
with the German secretary of state for foreign affairs, Count Herbert von Bismarck, 
whether the government intended to return Hanover to the Guelphs and Alsace-
Lorraine to France, as had purportedly been the wish of the deceased monarch.64 Soon 
different rumours started circulating about what was said and by whom, but the upshot 
of the reports that reached the ears of Kaiser Wilhelm II was in any case to set the 
young monarch against his uncle. Matters were not helped by the fact that when the 
kaiser embarked on his first state visits to the Baltic region a few weeks later, Queen 
Louise of Denmark, a Hesse-Kassel princess by birth, and her daughter Tsarina Maria 
Feodorovna broached the same subject. By way of rejoinder, he made a speech at 
Frankfurt an der Oder on the anniversary of the battles of Thionville and Mars la Tour 
that heralded a key phase in the deterioration of Anglo-German dynastic 
relations.65 ¶7KHUH DUHSHRSOH·WKXQGHUHG:LOKHOP 
who have the impudence to maintain that my father wanted to give up what he, together with the 
ODWH3ULQFH>)ULHGULFK.DUO@ZRQRQWKHILHOGRIEDWWOH«,EHOLHYHWKDWHYHU\RQHRIXV«LQWKH
army knows that there can be only one opinion on this matter, namely, that we would rather see 
the whole of our eighteen army corps and our forty-two million inhabitants perish on the 
battlefield than surrender a single stone of what my father and Prince Friedrich Karl gained. 
After WKH VSHHFKKHZDVKHDUG VD\LQJ ORXGO\ WR D FRPSDQLRQ ¶,KRSHP\XQFOH WKH
3ULQFHRI:DOHVZLOOXQGHUVWDQGWKDW·66 
'HVSLWHWKHREYLRXVXVHRIK\SHUEROHIRUGUDPDWLFHIIHFWWKHNDLVHU·VUHFRXUVHWRWKH
language of total war bore powerful testimony to the way in which unresolved dynastic 
grievances intersected with German nationalism and international relations, all under 
the attentive gaze of the international press. As on previous occasions, interventions by 
PHPEHUVRI(XURSH·VUR\DOKRXVHVKDGIDLOHGWR achieve their objective and, worse, had 
humiliated the supplicants themselves in a very public fashion. The British liberal 
periodical TruthIRULQVWDQFHUHSRUWHGWKDWWKH3ULQFHRI:DOHV·HQTXLU\KDGSURPSWHG
the kaiser to discourage the Prussian prince Friedrich Leopold from taking an English 
ZLIHDQGWHOOLQJO\FRQFOXGHG¶7KLVZLOOEHDEORZWRRXU5R\DO)DPLO\DVWKHLU´QHZ
JHQHUDWLRQµKDYHVRIDUEHHQVLQJXODUO\XQIRUWXQDWHLQWKHLUZRRLQJV·67 If the ability of 
royals to bring about political change head-on was therefore quite limited, their lack of 
LPSDFWVWRRGLQLQYHUVHSURSRUWLRQWRWKHUHDFKRIWKHLU¶VRIWSRZHU· 
Royal Diplomacy in a Different Key 
Beside constitutional prerogatives and the discourse of divine kingship, which in a 
Weberian sense formed the legal and custom-bound foundations of royal legitimacy, 
monarchs also possessed what the American political scientist Joseph S. Nye has termed 
soft power. Instead of relying on coercion to enforce their will, leaders can use 
persuasion to make others agree with their views, though such soft power is difficult to 
wield because its effects depend heavily on acceptance by the receiving audiences and 
may take years to become visible.68 To generate trust, Clifford Geertz posits in his 
LQIOXHQWLDOUXPLQDWLRQVRQNLQJVKLSPRQDUFKVPXVW¶WDNHV\PEROLFSRVVHVVLRQRIWKHLU
UHDOP·DQGDIILUPWKHLU ¶FRQQHFWLRQZLWK WUDQVFHQGHQW WKLQJVE\VWDPSLQJD WHUULWRU\
ZLWKULWXDOVLJQVRIGRPLQDQFH·69 This important insight begs the question of what is to 
be done when two or more rulers assert claims to the same territory. Recent 
comparative work by Torsten Riotte on the Guelph movement and the 
Bourbon Légitimistes in France has shown that in the nineteenth century exile did not 
preclude dethroned monarchs from competing with the new incumbents for the 
allegiance of the people. They did so via social networks, political parties and clubs that 
survived for many decades.70 The next part of the article will consider how the 
HohenzollernV ¶VSUHDG WKHLU RZQ VFHQW· WR ERUURZ *HHUW]·V PHWDSKRU DQG
supplemented political concessions to their dynastic detractors with the use of soft 
power.71 
In the new Prussian provinces, winning the love of the governed for the sovereign 
(Untertanenliebe) was a multi-stage process after 1866. In the first instance, the 
government needed to secure the release of officials and soldiers from their oath of 
allegiance to the exiled monarchs and negotiate the amalgamation of existing 
institutions such as the civil service, the church, parliament and other public bodies with 
the Prussian state. Most of the reforms were accomplished within a year, the so-
called Diktaturjahr. Some measures were imposed from above, as the moniker implies, 
but others involved extensive consultations of local notables. Overall the administrative 
incorporation of the annexed provinces proceeded smoothly, even if overt compliance 
did not necessarily signify love for Prussia or its rulers.72 In fact, reports and local 
protests pointed to continuing emotional detachment among large segments of the 
population, either because the Hohenzollerns were still an unknown quantity or because 
legitimists decried them as usurpers.73 For that reason King Wilhelm and Crown Prince 
Friedrich Wilhelm waited aOPRVW WZR \HDUV WR YLVLW WKH OLRQ·V GHQ RI DQWL-Prussian 
agitation, the city of Hannover. The crown prince showed much surprise at the 
SURYLQFLDOJRYHUQRU·VDVVXUDQFHWKDWWKHFURZGVOLQLQJWKHVWUHHWVZHUHLQIDFWJHQXLQH
Hanoverians and confided to his dLDU\DWWKHHQGRIWKHYLVLW¶7KDQN*RGLWLVRYHU·74 
)ULHGULFK :LOKHOP·V LQVHFXULW\ VWHPPHG IURP WKH FRQWUDFWXDO XQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of Untertanenliebe that prevailed in the political discourse of constitutional monarchies 
by the second half of the nineteenth century.75 Rather than legitimizing the exercise of 
power from the top down, royal pomp and circumstance had come to rely on an implicit 
dialogue with the audience, which exposed monarchs to the judgement of their subjects, 
for better or worse. The need to impress the public acquired a heightened urgency in 
the new provinces because even though Friedrich Wilhelm had little patience for 
nostalgic particularists, his wife, a self-proclaimed liberal and strong influence on him, 
objected to the annexations on the grounds of their having been carried out without 
the express wish of the people. She advocated German unification through moral 
conquest and wished for her husband to be seen as a champion of justice by the general 
public.76 Evidence suggests that the appropriatiRQRIRWKHUG\QDVWLHV·V\PEROLFFDSLWDO
EHFDPH D IDYRXUHGPHDQV WR UDLVH WKH+RKHQ]ROOHUQG\QDVW\·VPRUDO VWRFN9LHZHG
through a Bourdieusian lens, symbolic capital denotes the capacity of individuals or 
institutions to impose classifications on the world and thereby shape the perceptions of 
their environment. Credibility hinges on the societal standing of the actors in question, 
whose authority corresponds with the credit they have accumulated in previous 
struggles to exercise symbolic power.77 Applied to the situation in Germany, monarchs 
had managed to amass a considerable wealth of symbolic capital in the five decades of 
intensive state-building that preceded the German War. From the Hohenzollern 
vantage point it made logical sense to tap this resource, either by drawing public 
attention to historic kinship ties or by pursuing intermarriages where these bonds were 
ODFNLQJRUE\¶FRPPDQGHHULQJ·WKHKHULWDJHRIWKHLUULYDOVRXWULJKW 
Take the example of Hesse-.DVVHO·VG\QDVW\WKH+RXVHRI%UDEDQW2ZLQJWo a shared 
Calvinist background there existed close affinities with the Prussian royal family, which 
explains in part why the last elector counted more Prussian than Hessian 
ancestors.78 Wilhelm made a point of honouring this familial bond by granting his 
FRXVLQ·VZLVKWREHEXULHGLQ.DVVHOLQDQGJLYLQJVHUYDQWVRIWKHIRUPHUHOHFWRU
who had been convicted in absentia of crimes against Prussia, permission to accompany 
WKHLU PDVWHU·V ERG\ 7KH NDLVHU HYHQ YLVLWHG WKH WRPE DW OHDVW RQFH79 Such 
demonstrations of royal clemency towards a vanquished enemy fell on fertile soil 
EHFDXVH WKH HOHFWRU·V VXFFHVVRU DV KHDG RI WKH %UDEDQW IDPLO\ /DQGJUDYH )ULHGULFK
Wilhelm, was already married to a Hohenzollern princess and was prepared to renounce 
his rights to the Hessian crown in return for generous compensation. In 1893 his son 
)ULHGULFK.DUOVHDOHGWKHG\QDVWLFFRQWUDFWE\W\LQJWKHNQRWZLWK.DLVHU:LOKHOP,,·V
youngest sister, Princess Margarethe. Perhaps the ultimate tribute to the assimilation of 
Hesse-KDVVHO·V G\QDVWLF WUDGLWLRQV LQWR 3UXVVLD·V ZDV WKH UHKDELOLWDWLRQ RI (OHFWRU
)ULHGULFK:LOKHOP·VPHPRU\LQWKHDUP\RIDOOSODFHVZKLFKJDYHRIILFHUV·PHVVHVLQ
Hessian-recruited regiments permission to observe his birthday and in 1899 officially 
transferred the traditions of the defunct kurhessisch military forces onto these units.80 
The Prussian court was prepared to bend dynastic etiquette far to accelerate this process 
RIIXVLRQ,QWKHIXWXUH.DLVHU:LOKHOP,,PDUULHG'XNH)ULHGULFK9,,,·VGDXJKter 
Auguste Viktoria, despite doubts concerning the royal status (Ebenbürtigkeit) of the 
Augustenburg lineage.81 A mésalliancemight have damaged the international reputation of 
the imperial family under other circumstances, but in this case the negative fallout was 
PRUHWKDQRIIVHWE\)ULHGULFK9,,,·VDJUHHPHQWWRVHFUHWO\UHQRXQFHKLVFODLPRQWKH
two duchies in return.82 That both sides were prepared to make such major concessions 
points to the propagandistic value of dynastic reconciliation, as can also be gauged from 
the following pathos-laden speech Wilhelm II gave in Kiel four years after the betrothal 
of his son August Wilhelm to Princess Alexandra Viktoria, a member of the extended 
Schleswig-Holstein clan, in 1911: 
The entry of a lovely daughter from the House of Glücksburg into my House has forged fresh 
bonds between Schleswig-Holstein and Me on top of the already existing ones owing to My 
marriage to Her Majesty the Empress. This serene woman, who is the first lady in our country by 
virtue of her being the Prussian queen and German empress, is, I am convinced, proudly viewed 
as a compatriot by all Schleswig-Holsteiners. 
The quotation underscores the extent to which Hohenzollern marriage strategies and 
monarchical nationalism complemented each other: according to the logic of the 
NDLVHU·V VSHHFK WKH WZR 6FKOHVZLJ-Holstein princesses remained true to their 
ancestral Heimat precisely because they had agreed to let bygones be bygones when they 
became the wives of the most powerful royal family in Germany, in whose reflected 
glory all Schleswig-Holsteiners could now bask and from whom they could expect 
PDWHULDOKHOSZKHQHYHU¶HPHUJHQFLHVQHHGHGDPHOLRUDWLQJ·83 
A further variant of the transmutation of dynastic conflict into a narrative of synergy 
came to the fore in the dealings of the Hohenzollerns with the Guelphs and the House 
of Nassau. More so than in the other cases, the duke of Cumberland and Duke Adolph 
entertained a genuine hope of returning to the select circle of sovereign princes one 
day, yet they elected to stay clear of the Prussian court, in part to affirm their protest 
against the perceived iniquities they had suffered and in part because their candidature 
for the thrones of Brunswick and Luxembourg kept their future in an animated state of 
suspension. To bridge the chasm, the Hohenzollerns launched a series of good-will 
initiatives from the mid-1880s onwards to soften the resistance of the two exiled 
monarchs. Three years before his untimely death, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm 
approached Duke Adolph through the good offices of their common relative, Grand 
Duke Friedrich I of Baden, to inform him that the German government would raise no 
objections to his succession in the grand duchy of Luxembourg. Why the crown prince 
and his son, Kaiser Wilhelm II, extended this guarantee has been a matter of debate. 
One historian of the Nassauvian succession in Luxembourg has suggested that the 
Hohenzollerns were hoping to get German-Luxembourg relations off to a fresh start 
in order to pave the way for closer relations.84 Whatever the truth, German official 
QHZVSDSHUVUHDGLO\UHSRUWHGRQWKHNDLVHU·VFKDUPRIIHQVLYHDQGLWVHIIHFWVFRPPHQWLQJ
WKDW ¶LPSHULDO KRQRXUV· ZHUH KHDSHG XSRQ WKH QHZ JUDQG GXNH GXULQJ D SHUVRQDO
PHHWLQJLQDQGWKDWWKHSDLUDIWHUZDUGVSDUOD\HGLQDQ¶XQIRUFHG·PDQQHU85 The 
following year the Guelphs became the beneficiaries of even greater largesse when 
Chancellor Leo von Caprivi decided to return their sequestrated property because his 
SUHGHFHVVRU·V QRWRULRXV VOXVK IXQG WKH Welfenfonds, was starting to cause the 
government undue legal embarrassment.86 The climax of reconciliation was reached 
with the highly publicized wedding of tKHGXNHRI&XPEHUODQG·VVRQDQG:LOKHOP,,·V
only daughter, in 1913, which cleared the path at last for the installation of a Guelph on 
the throne of Brunswick after a thirty-year regency.87 
Although the Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung legitimately objected that imperial pressure on 
the Federal Council to confirm Prince Ernst August as duke of Brunswick even without 
KLV IDWKHU·V UHQXQFLDWLRQ RI WKH +DQRYHULDQ FURZQ IOHZ LQ WKH IDFH RI DOO HDUOLHU
resolutions, the newspaper was missing the larger point of the exercise.88 The fiction 
that the Kaiserreich represented a federation of princes governing through the Federal 
Council had long given way to a kaiser-centred system of monarchy, which publically 
VW\OHG:LOKHOP,,WKHVXSUHPHDUELWHURI*HUPDQ\·VSROLWLFDO fate. This power shift in 
WKH ZDNH RI :LOKHOP ,,·V ¶SHUVRQDO UHJLPH· UHQGHUHG LQWHU-dynastic reconciliation 
KRVWDJHWRWKHZKLPVRIWKHNDLVHU·VPHUFXULDOSHUVRQDOLW\DQGPXFKRIWKDWUHVWOHVV
energy was channelled into what Isabel V. Hull has appropriatHO\FDOOHGD¶IL[DWLRQXSRQ
V\PEROLFH[WHUQDOGHWDLO·89 
A chain of incidents at the turn of the century showcases this point well. During a visit 
to Hannover in September 1898 for the annual imperial army manoeuvres, the kaiser 
gave two evocative speeches which signalled a desire for better relations with the 
Guelph side of his family. Taking advantage of recent Anglo-German talks about a 
possible alliance, he first selected the pregnant backdrop of the Waterloo Column to 
HPSKDVL]H%ULWDLQDQG*HUPDQ\·VFlose historical association by congratulating Queen 
9LFWRULD¶ZKRDVFRORQHO-in-chief of a German regiment also belongs to the [German] 
DUP\·RQWKHYLFWRU\RIWKH%ULWLVKIRUFHVDW2PGXUPDQ,QDVHFRQGVSHHFKEHIRUH
Hanoverian dignitaries in the Ständehaus KHFRPSDUHG+DQRYHU·V¶VRUHO\WHVWHG·IRUPHU
queen, Marie, to the Prussian patriotic icon Queen Luise.90 Since he genuinely believed 
that his symbolic statements were sufficiently powerful to vanquish the legitimist 
opposition, he felt personally rejected by the news that the Guelph press continued to 
lambast his government and that sympathizers had presented a sword to the duke of 
&XPEHUODQG·VVRQWREHXVHGDJDLQVW3UXVVLDDQGKHKLWEDFNKDUG¶7KDWWKLVDXJXVW
lady [Marie] and the House of Guelph in no way acknowledged the obligingness [of the 
NDLVHU@VWUXFN+LV0DMHVW\DVUDWKHUSHFXOLDU·WKHLPSHULDOFDELQHWZDVLQIRUPHG¶7KDW
WKH*XHOSK3DUW\ VKRXOG UHDFWZLWK WKHVDPH LPSXGHQFH· WKHPLVVLYHFRQWLQXHG ¶LV
XQDFFHSWDEOH·91 The Prussian interior ministry promptly cobbled together a grandiose 
plan to combat the Guelph movement, which called for concerted action by all 
government agencies, the creation of a special police task force, more stringent 
background checks on officials, the mobilization of the Conservative Party and patriotic 
DVVRFLDWLRQV DQG UHGRXEOHG HIIRUWV WR VWUHQJWKHQ ¶3UXVVLDQ VWDWH FRQVFLRXVQHVV· YLD
schools, public libraries, newspaper propaganda and strategic agricultural 
subsidies.92 Although the interior minister concurred with the Hanoverian provincial 
JRYHUQRU·VDVVHVVPHQW WKDW WKH*XHOSK3DUW\ LQ WKH Reichstag was facing decline even 
without outside interference, the authorities implemented surveillance anyway, as the 
compilation of secret dossiers on suspected Guelph sympathizers by the office of the 
governor bear out.93 :KLOH:LOKHOP,,·VDPELWLRXVDJHQGDLQFHUWDLQUHVSHFWVUHVHPEOHG
WKHWULHGDQGWHVWHGPRGHORI%DYDULDQ¶QDWLRQ-EXLOGLQJ·LQLWLDWHGE\.LQJ0D[LPLOLDQ,,
after the revolution of 1848, the scope of the kaiVHU·VSODQVZDVSRWHQWLDOO\PRUHIDU-
reaching, thanks to advances in the quality of mass education and the proliferation of 
government-sponsored libraries since the 1860s.94 
2QHRI:LOKHOP,,·VPRVWSURPLQHQWFKDUDFWHUWUDLWV7KRPDV.RKXWKDVVKRZQLQKLV 
sharp psycho-historical portrait of the last kaiser, was an abiding desire to please the 
public. Even at his most imperious, he exercised royal soft power to make himself a 
FXOWXUDOLQWHUPHGLDU\EHWZHHQ¶PDQ\GLIIHUHQW*HUPDQLHVZKLFKZHUHRQO\XQLWHGLQthe 
QDWLRQDOILJXUHRIWKH.DLVHU·95 Only two months after his rant against the Guelphs, for 
instance, in January 1899 he issued the above-PHQWLRQHG¶GHFUHHRQWUDGLWLRQ·ZKRVH
JUDIWLQJ RI WKH GHIXQFW +DQRYHULDQ DQG +HVVLDQ DUP\·V KHULWDJH RQWR 3UXVVLDQ
UHJLPHQWV FRQVWLWXWHG DQ DSSDUHQW ELG WR ¶FRQWULEXWH WR WKH EULGJLQJ RI GLIIHUHQFHV·
between provincial, Prussian and national identities.96 A symbolic act with similar intent 
was the dispatch of the German crown prince to Hannover in July 1910, on the 
cenWHQDU\RI4XHHQ/XLVH·VGHDWKRQZKLFKRFFDVLRQ:LOKHOP,,·VKHLUSUHVHQWHGWKH
FLW\IDWKHUVZLWKDFRS\RI-RKDQQ*RWWIULHG6FKDGRZ·VIDPRXVGRXEOHVWDWXHRIWKH
dead female monarch and her sister Friederike. The meaning of the gift was easy to 
divine. Depicting the ancestors of the kaiser and the duke of Cumberland in a warm 
HPEUDFHWKH¶XQLRQRIWKHWZRVLVWHUV«HSLWRPL]HVWKHFORVHFRQQHFWLRQWKHIXVLRQ
RIWKHLUVWDWHVZKLFKZDVGHVLUHGE\IDWHDQGVDQFWLRQHGE\JHRJUDSKLFDOORFDWLRQ·DV
one pamphleteer put it. By way of rejoinder to the perpetual cry of the Guelphs that 
WKH+RKHQ]ROOHUQVZHUHQRW+DQRYHU·VOHJLWLPDWHVRYHUHLJQVWKHVDPHDXWKRUSRLQWHG
out that no member of the Guelph family had so far deemed it necessary to erect a 
monument to their kinswoman Frederica and that it was therefore up to the kaiser to 
FRQIHUKLV¶VRYHUHLJQJUDFH·landesväterliche Huld) on her.97 
7KHLPSHULDOGHFUHHRIDQGWKHDSSURSULDWLRQRI)UHGHULFD·VPHPRU\WROHJLWLPL]H
Prussian-state-building exemplify the SHUYDVLYHQHVVRI ¶PDVV-SURGXFHG LQYHQWLRQV· LQ
the Kaiserreich, which conjured a sense of historical continuity and celebrated 
experiences that linked East Elbian Prussia to the rest of Germany. Eric Hobsbawm 
and other historians since have identified WilKHOP,,DVRQHRIWKHSKHQRPHQRQ·VSULPH
instigators.98 However, recent research has begun to offer a salutary corrective by 
questioning this top-down conceptualization of royal propaganda. Rather than being 
forced down the throats of an unsuspecting public, more often than not strategies of 
monarchical self-representation followed the lead of self-confident urban elites and 
bourgeois entrepreneurs who hoped to gain social prestige, emotional satisfaction and 
commercial rewards from their association with the cult of monarchy.99 Hosting royalty 
became a particularly effective vehicle for honouring not only the exalted guest but also 
PXQLFLSDOLWLHV·RZQDFKLHYHPHQWVDQGZHDOWK:LOKHOP,,·VILUVWYLVLWWR+DQQRYHUDV
emperor, in 1889, was a case in point. The magistrate set aside the vast sum of 84,000 
Reichsmark so that sixty architects, sculptors and painters could suitably impress the 
German sovereign.100 The visual symbolism of the artwork threw into relief how much 
licence these agents of municipal pride claimed in the dissemination of Hohenzollern 
invented traditions. On the Leinestraße a double-DUFKHG ¶WULXPSKDO JDWH· ZLWK D ODUJH
VWDWXHRI4XHHQ/XLVHDWLWVFHQWUHDQGDEDQQHUUHDGLQJ¶:HOFRPHWRWKHSODFHRIP\
ELUWK·DZDLWHGWKHNDLVHU101 The selection of Queen Luise was significant, for Wilhelm 
,,·V SUHGHFHVVRUV KDG SXUSRVHIXOO\ DOORZHG WKHPVHOYHV WR EH FRQQHFWHG ZLWK WKLV
popular idol of feminine virtue in order to soften the martial image of the Hohenzollern 
PRQDUFK\ EXW +DQQRYHU·V FLW\ IDWKHUV Vet their own accents by stressing the 
Hanoverian origins of the Prussian queen.102 It spoke to the authority of these local 
SRZHUEURNHUVWKDWWKHNDLVHU·VJLIWWRWKHPXQLFLSDOLW\VRPHWZHQW\\HDUVODWHUZKLFK
depicted Luise and her sister in their youth, still adhered to the discursive shift 
HVWDEOLVKHGE\WKHPDJLVWUDWHGXULQJ:LOKHOP,,·VILUVWYLVLW 
The formative hand of provincial elites in the propagation of monarchical culture and, 
by extension, dynastic reconciliation likewise became very evident in the execution of 
the Nassauvian State Monument: the spiritus rectorof the project, the mayor of Biebrich, 
retired officers, officials and professionals requested Wilhelm II and the grand duke of 
/X[HPERXUJ·VHQGRUVHPHQWDIWHU WKHGHFLVLRQ WRHUHFWDPHmorial had already been 
PDGH'HVSLWHWKHVSRQVRUV·JUDWLWXGHWRWKHGXNHVRI1DVVDXIRUKDYLQJFUHDWHGWKH
eponymous region they inhabited, the actual purpose of the monument related only 
indirectly to the institution of monarchy itself, as it was above all concerned with the 
SURPRWLRQRI WKH ORFDO WRXULVW LQGXVWU\ WKHHOHYDWLRQRI1DVVDX·VUHJLRQDOSURILOH LQ
Germany and the strengthening of conservative consciousness to rein in the burgeoning 
influence of socialism in local politics.103 
The involvement of businessmen, doctors, architects and other members of the 
¶UHVSHFWDEOHFODVVHV·LQFKDULWDEOHSURMHFWVRIWKLVQDWXUHVHUYHGRQHIXUWKHULPSRUWDQW
function, namely to confirm their status within the bourgeoisie. For much of the 
nineteenth century, public cultural institutions throughout western Europe³whether 
theatres, concert houses, art galleries or museums³depended primarily on private 
rather than state initiative.104Counter-intuitively, it was precisely the vibrancy of civil 
society which facilitated the popularization of monarchy and a grass-roots interest in 
dynastic affinities and enmities. As with monument projects and municipal festivities 
IRUWKHNDLVHUSKLODQWKURSLVWV·FROODERUDWLRQZLWKWKH+RKHQ]ROOHUQFRXUWDQGPRQDUFKV
in exile was not free from ulterior motives, since it could be financially rewarding to 
play off one side against the other. This was the route chosen by the steering committee 
RIRQHRI:LOKHOPLQH*HUPDQ\·VSUHPLHU Heimat museums, the Fatherland Museum in 
Celle.105 
Like most such organizations, the Fatherland Museum rose to prominence on the 
coattails of 1890s reform movements, which aimed to preserve folklore, art and cultural 
heritage from the ravages of industrialization. The Celle Museum Association, led by 
the industrialist Wilhelm Bomann, concentrated its energies on Hanoverian military, 
farming and guild traditions. Since the availability of public and private sources of 
funding proved insufficient to pay for the housing of the growing artefact collection, 
the members of the Museum Association hit upon the idea of using their social 
connections to secure donations from both the duke of Cumberland and the kaiser. 
Having received assurances that the museum displays were not offensive to Guelph 
sensibilities and also buoyed by the victory of the local Guelph Party candidate in 
the Reichstag elections of 1898, the duke readily parted with 45,000 Reichsmark for the 
construction of a new venue, which made his the single largest donation thus far. The 
GXNH·V JHQHURVLW\ HPEDUUDVVed the Prussian authorities because when the Museum 
$VVRFLDWLRQ DVNHG :LOKHOP ,, WR GRQDWH D PRQXPHQWDO EDWWOH PXUDO IRU D ¶KDOO RI
KRQRXU·GHGLFDWHGWRWKH+DQRYHULDQDUP\WKHGLVWULFWSUHVLGHQWDGYLVHGWKDWDUHIXVDO
would add welcome grist to the Guelph propaganda mill. After much internal debate 
the kaiser granted the request and appointed the well-known military painter Carl 
Röchling to execute a painting of the battle of the Göhrde (1813).106 The motif of 
Hanoverian and Prussian soldiers fighting shoulder to shoulder neutralized the 
PXVHXP·V LQVWUXPHQWDOL]DWLRQ IRU RQH-sided partisan causes and hence made it 
politically safe for everybody, including Prussian officers, envoys from the duke of 
Cumberland, school classes, Lutheran confirmees and³above all³the kaiser to 
visit.107 The genesis of the Fatherland Museum accentuated semiotic ambiguities in 
monarchical soft power, which both the Hohenzollerns and Guelphs wielded with 
enough suppleness by the 1910s to allow for a degree of synergy while at the same time 
giving philanthropists room to leave their own mark on the process of dynastic 
reconciliation. Tellingly the main winner to emerge from this quest was the self-
confident bourgeois entrepreneur Bomann, who netted several high medals and the 
coveted WLWOHRI¶SURIHVVRU·IRUKLVHIIRUWV108 
 Conclusion 
6KRUWO\ DIWHU (UQVW $XJXVW DQG 9LNWRULD /XLVH·V DFFHVVLRQ WR WKH GXFDO WKURQH RI
Brunswick The Economist published a short report which reflected on the significance of 
this event. It concluded that 
no possible danger to Prussia can result from the concession, and the Government is to be 
congratulated in going far to remove a cause of dissatisfaction which, although not so acute, stood 
at least in the same category as the three great questions of North Schleswig, Poland, and Alsace-
Lorraine.109 
This statement bears powerful witness to the troublesome legacy that the German War 
bequeathed to the Kaiserreich. As this article has endeavoured to show, the Hohenzollern 
FRXUW·VGHFLVLRQWRSXW raison G·pWDW above dynastic solidarity in 1866 alienated it from 
influential sections of the Royal International and unsettled proponents of a dynasty-
centred, federal conception of German nationhood, making the repercussions felt 
nationally and internationally. Where the grievances of legitimists intersected with other 
contentious issues, such as the twists and turns of Bismarckian foreign policy and 
:LOKHOP,,·VDPELWLRQWRHVWDEOLVKKLV¶SHUVRQDOUHJLPH·WKH\KDGWKHSRWHQWLDOWRGLVUXSW
not only the normal functioning of government but also the lives of the Hohenzollerns 
themselves. The helpless response of Crown Prince Friedrich and his English wife to 
the cross-pressures of German diplomacy and the interventions of their foreign 
relatives on behalf of the Guelphs during the Danish-German crisis of 1878 was a 
notable example which underscored the inability or unwillingness of European states 
to clearly delineate dynastic from national interests. While this finding prima facie 
supports the prevailing view that monarchs transformed themselves into national 
ILJXUHKHDGVLQWKHFRXUVHRIWKHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\WKHLUMXVWLILFDWRU\XVHRI¶QDWLRQDO
SXEOLFRSLQLRQ· WRSURPRWH WKH FDXVHRIG\QDVWLF UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ UHPLQGVXV WKDW WKH
remoulding of the monarchy in the image of nationalism was far from unidirectional.110 
This discursive conversation between the Hohenzollerns and their subjects was in no 
small part sustained by the enterprising spirit of local elites. The mayor of Biebrich, the 
Celle industrialist Bomann and the magistrate of Hannover were free agents who 
VXEVFULEHG WR D ¶ODQJXDJH RI OR\DOW\· WR ERUURZ /DXUHQFH &ROH·V DQDORJXH IURP
Habsburg history) not out of subservience but rather because they expected tangible 
gains from their association with the monarchy.111 The sophisticated deployment of 
historical references in their dialogue with the Hohenzollerns, Guelphs and House of 
Nassau at the same time sheds revealing light on the extent to which these elites had 
internalized the monarchical nationalism promoted by particularist state builders in the 
first half of the nineteenth century and enshrined by the constitution of the Kaiserreich. 
0XFKRIWKLVDUJXPHQWIDOOVLQOLQHZLWK$ELJDLO*UHHQ·VDQG(YD*LORL·VVFKRODUVKLSRQ
political regionalism and the material culture of monarchy in Germany, but this essay 
goes further since it contends that the Hohenzollerns³especially Wilhelm II³were 
more creative in their methods of monarchical self-legitimization than they have been 
given credit for. In contrast to the work RI *LORL ZKLFK SRVLWV WKDW ¶+RKHQ]ROOHUQ
G\QDVWLF DQHFGRWHVZHUHHPRWLRQDOO\ DFFHVVLEOHRQO\ZLWKLQ3UXVVLD·V FRUH WHUULWRULHV·
because royal mythology tended to revolve too much around traditional heroes of 
Prusso-Brandenburgian history like the Great Elector, Frederick the Great and Queen 
/XLVH WR OHDYH VSDFH ¶IRUGLYHUVLRQ LQWR DOWHUQDWHSROLWLFDO V\PEROV· WKHFDVH VWXGLHV
GLVFXVVHGDERYHXQGHUVFRUHWKH3UXVVLDQFRXUW·VDGURLWDSSURSULDWLRQRIRWKHUG\QDVWLHV·
accomplishments and co-optation of the deposed royal houses to enhance their own 
symbolic capital.112 ,W VSHDNV WR D ¶UHPDUNDEOH FRQVLVWHQF\RISROLWLFDOZLOO IURPHDFK
JHQHUDWLRQWRWKHQH[W·LQWKH+RKHQ]ROOHUQIDPLO\EXWDOVRWRWKHSHUFHLYHGVHULRXVQHVV
of the fractures within the Royal International after 1866 that all three emperors kept 
chipping away at the dynastic antagonisms despite their very different personalities and 
the resulting recurrence of conflict between fathers and sons.113 
Thus, although the victory of Prussian arms had been swift and decisive, the aftershocks 
of the German War were slow to abate, making monarchical state-building by way of 
state destruction an important site of contestation through which the Kaiserreich·V
crowned heads, related royals abroad and ordinary Germans negotiated the complex 
challenges posed by the unification of this heterogeneous nation-state in the heart of 
Europe. 
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